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Developing a Demand Revealing Market Criterion for Contingent Valuation Validity Tests 
A critical issue in environmental economics and public policy is the ability of 
contingent valuation (CV) to estimate "actual" willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental 
commodities. Early validity field research compared hypothetical CV responses with values 
obtained from "simulated market" transactions for private (e.g. strawberries: Dickie et al.) 
and quasi-public goods (e.g. hunting permits: Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), concluding that 
"the overwhelming weight from simulated market experiments favors the use of contingent 
valuation for estimating willingness to pay" [Bishop and Heberlein, 1990, p. 101]. More 
recent efforts have sought to extend CVIsimulated market comparisons to less familiar 
public goods with large nonuse components: Duffield and Patterson conducted such com­
parisons for leasing water rights for threatened trout streams, Siep and Strand evaluated 
hypothetical and actual sign-ups for an environmental organization, and Brown et af. com­
pared hypothetical and real donations for the removal of roads at the Grand Canyon. I 
Together, these studies have demonstrated considerable differences between hypothetical 
and actual contributions, which have largely been attributed to biases associated with the 
hypothetical nature of CV. For example, Brown et af. [po 164] argue that "Hypothetical 
questions, especially about donations to generally desirable environmental goods, seem to 
engender overestimates of actual WTP." Consistent with such analysis, efforts are under­
way to "calibrate" CV responses to correct for hypothetical bias [e.g. Champ et al.]. 
In this paper, we argue that past CV/simulated market comparisons may provide 
-
J To the authors' credit, concern that such mechanisms allow for free-riding was noted in 
each article. It, of course, remains an open question whether there are incentives to free 
ride or behave strategically in the hypothetical CV questionnaire. 
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biased estimates of the hypothetical bias associated with valuing public goods. At issue is 
the fact that the volWltaIy contributions mechanisms used to solicit real monetary payments 
in these studies are likely to Wlderestimate true preferences, and thus provide a false refer­
ence point for evaluating hypothetical bias. If this is true, the degree of hypothetical bias 
will be overstated and efforts to calibrate CV are premature. The immediate focus should 
instead be on developing mechanisms to better reveal true values as a reference point for 
validity tests. Building on an extensive research base in experimental economics, progress 
is reported on efforts to develop such a mechanism. 
Experimental Economics Lessons: The Need for a One-Shot Demand Revealing Mechanism 
An important finding from decades ofeconomic experiments is that no public goods 
elicitation mechanism, even if it is theoretically incentive compatible, is perfectly demand 
revealing in practice. Here, demand revelation is defined in the purely empirical sense that 
individuals provide their true values through payments to a public fund. Public goods 
experiments are able to assess the degree of demand revelation because the true values of 
individual participants for a public good are induced by, and thus known to, the researcher. 
Some public goods mechanisms that increase incentives for honest revelation have 
been developed over the years, and have been shown to approach demand revelation in 
laboratory experiments. Extending these mechanisms to CV field research is, however, 
problematic. Mechanisms such as the Groves-Ledyard [Groves and Ledyard] often involve 
complex incentive structures--greatly limiting their applicability and usefulness in situations 
-

outside of confined laboratory settings. Other mechanisms such as the Smith Auction 
[Smith 1979, 1980; Coursey and Smith; Harstead and Marrese] require Wlanimity, which 
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necessitates an interactive small-group situation. Moreover, these techniques require 
multiple rounds before they approximate individual (Groves-Ledyard) or group (Smith) 
demand revelation. 
Given these difficulties, it is no surprise that CV researchers have turned to voluntary 
contribution mechanisms (VCM), which simply ask individuals to choose between submit­
ting to a group ftmd with known returns and keeping their money in a private account. Such 
a technique is individually based, amenable to the single decision situations found in CV 
validity tests, and is readily viewed as a parallel to the standard hypothetical CV question. 
Yet, in theory, a standard VCM provides little or no economic incentive for one to contrib­
ute to a public good, let alone to truthfully reveal demand. Further, the large body of 
empirical research on VCM indicates that individuals contribute about 40 to 60 percent of 
the optimum in actual VCM public goods experiments involving real money (see Ledyard 
for a comprehensive review). From the standpoint of testing hypothetical bias, it is, thus, of 
serious concern that such VCM techniques have been used as the reference criterion in 
public goods CVIsimulated markets experiments. 
Three important additions to the VCM have been suggested and shown to improve 
contributions in public goods experiments. I) A provision point (PP) is a minimum amount 
of aggregate contributions below which the public good is not provided. Isaac, Schmidtz 
and Walker, Suleiman and Rapoport, and Dawes, Orbell, Simmons and van de Kragt report 
that adding a PP significantly increases contributions. 2) A money-back guarantee (MBG) 
-
is a feature that can be added to the provision point mechanism (pPM) whereby individual 
contributions are reftmded if the PP is not reached by the group. Isaac, Schmidtz and 
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Walker report contribution level on average four times higher in treatments with the MBG 
compared to baseline PP experiments. 3) A rebate rule for refunding of contributions in 
excess of the provision point also offers assurance against the potential loss of contribu­
tions. In the proportional rebate (PR) rule, all excess contributions are returned to individu­
als in proportion to the weight ofone's contributions in the public good fund (see Marks for 
a study of alternative rebate rules). 
The PPM with MBG and PR has been successful at increasing contributions to 
public goods in experimental settings. Unfortunately, this mechanism has thus far failed to 
produce demand revelation. However, all existing PPM experiments to date have been 
conducted in settings that greatly depart from field conditions. In the next sections, we 
report the results of a series of laboratory experiments in which we explore the performance 
of the PPM with MBG and PR in experimental conditions that more closely mimic key 
features and constraints encountered in CV field applications. 
All experiments reported in this paper were conducted with subjects drawn from 
undergraduate Cornell University classes. At the beginning of each experiment, subjects 
read instructions that can be summarized as follows (instructions are available upon 
request). Participants are part of a group of students participating in a number of decision 
rounds. At the beginning of a round, each person in the group is given an initial balance of 
experimental dollars and must decide how much of this balance to keep and how much to 
allocate to a group fund. The group fund yields a return only if a predetermined investment 
-

cost (the PP) is met or exceeded. Ifthe sum of contributions is below the PP, contributions 
are fully refunded (the MBG) and individual earnings for the round are equal to the initial 
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balance. Alternatively, if the group sum of bids equals or exceeds the PP, individual 
earnings for the rOWld are the total of one's initial balance minus her bid, plus her personal 
return from the group fimd, plus a rebate equal to her share of the contributions in excess of 
the PP. The PR rule was explained and illustrated by one or more examples. Subjects were 
aware of the number of participants in their group and that everyone had the same 
endowment, but were not told the level ofthe ppl. Students knew their private payoff from 
the public good and that other students may not have the same payoff. Group size and 
subject types varied across experiments. These differences will be pointed out as required. 
Experiment 1. Small Groups of Business Students 
The first series of experiments that we report (which we will refer to as the "small group 
experiments") are the last three groups of a series of pretests conducted with students from 
an introductory economics class. The intent of these sessions was to test the PPIMBG/PR 
mechanism in small group situations akin to those conventionally used in economics 
experiments. All sessions were identical and serve as a baseline treatment for comparison 
with experiments presented in other studies as well as with our later experiments. 
Individual payoffs (i.e. the induced values) from the group fimd, if the provision 
point was met or exceeded, were the random numbers $2.12, $2.42, $3.69, $3.72, $3.76 and 
2 In theses experiments the total number of participants is known, but the provision 
point is unknown. This was done to introduce uncertainty in a manner such that 
participants would not gravitate towards a fair share value in which contributions 
approach the provision point value/number of participants. In contrast CV exercises 
­
and real public goods contributions such as land trusts, tend to have known provision 
points but unknown numbers of participants. Rondeau et al., report large group 
experimental results for such conditions, which are quite similar to those reported for 
experiments 2 and 3 below. 
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$3.90 experimental dollars, for aggregate benefits from (and aggregate demand for) the 
public good of $19.63. The randomly chosen provision point was $7.53, resulting in a 
benefit-cost ratio of 2.6. Experimental earnings were exchanged at the rate of one 
experimental dollar = $0.25. The interested reader may consult Rapoport et al.; Asch et al.; 
Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker; Bagnoli et al.; Cadsby et al. and Marks for PP experiments that 
share some ofour design features. As is common in this type ofexperiments, the game was 
repeated several times. However, the context in which CV studies are conducted most 
closely resemble the initial round. Hence, we limit our attention to the first period data. 
Let Vi and B; respectively denote individual i's induced value and contributions to 
the group fund. Then V; IB; is the proportion of individual i's induced value contributed 
toward the public good. We report the mean and median ofthis ratio and we also report the 
ratio ofthe aggregate demand revealed to the aggregate demand induced (LBi !L V;). Pool­
ing the data from all three small group experiments we find that individuals contributed an 
average of64% oftheir induced value to the public good. The median for these 18 subjects 
is at 72% ofvalue. In aggregate, the ratio of revealed to induced demands is 67%. The first 
column of Table 1 summarizes the results, which are consistent with aggregate demand 
results found in previous PPM research in small group settings (Marks, 64%; Cadsbyand 
Maynes, 61 %), but somewhat smaller than the 79% proportion computed from the first 
periods ofBagnoli and McKee's experiments with MBG and heterogenous valuations. 
Figure I illustrates our results under a different light. Bars represent individual 
-

induced values. They are graphed in descending order to form the induced demand step 
function. Individual contributions are also ordered from high to low and plotted as a line to 
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represent the revealed demand curve. Contrary to the results of most hypothetical CV 
studies, we do not observe extreme outliers when actual cash is transacted. In fact, this 
dataset contains only two bids that could be considered individually irrational in the sense 
that B j >V j • At the other end, free riding makes for a steeper than desirable revealed demand 
curve. It is clear that neither our small group experiments using a PPIMBG/PR mechanism 
nor those PPM experiments cited above were successful at eliciting induced values from 
subjects. Demand revelation ratios in the 60-80% range appear to be relatively robust in 
small groups of students trained in economics. Thus, although these results represent 
sizeable improvements over the VCM, it would be premature to use small group PPMs to 
assess the validity of hypothetical CV surveys. Indeed, based solely on these results, one 
could conclude that the PPIMBG/PR is an inappropriate market public goods mechanism to 
use as a reference point for testing hypothetical bias in CV. 
Table 1
 
Summary Statistics in Cents and Percentages
 
-

,­
Experiment! 
I Subjects 
n 
MeanV j 
I MeanBI: 
1) Small Groups 
Intro Economics 
18 
327 
218.1 
2) Environmental 
Economics 
50 
325.8 
349.0 
3) Natural 
Resources 
45 
300 
286.0 
• 
i 
i 
i 
I Median Bj I 200 380 300 
i MeanB~i 64.44% 110.01% 103.17% 
SD(B~;) 
I 
32.10% 48.53% 
----­
83.53% 
93.3% 
95.19% 
MedianB~j 
: Dem. Revealed 
72.0% 
66.65% 
--------­
104.0% 
107.13% 
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Experiment 2. Large Group of Environmental Economics Students 
For the second experiment, three modifications were made to the original design. 
The group size was significantly increased, subjects were recruited from an environmental 
economics class, and the experiment consisted of a single-period of decision making. The 
decision to increase group size was motivated by the fact that CV studies often sample large 
groups, rather than the typical small group size used in most public goods experiments. In 
addition, Isaac, Walker and Williams found that individuals in groups of40 and 100 individ­
uals contributed significantly more to a VCM public good that did subjects in small groups. 
The only large group PPM experiment we are aware ofwas recently conducted by Rose et 
a/. (n=100), and produced aggregate results consistent with demand revelation. In Rose et 
a/., subjects were given a dichotomous choice of contributing a fixed amount or nothing to 
a group fund within a PPM with a slightly different rebate rule consistent with a "Green 
Pricing" program offered by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. In the hope that group 
size effects carry over to the PPM with continuous contributions, we conducted experiment 
2 with a group of 50 students. 
We also modified the design to a single decision period. The primary motivations 
behind the adoption of the one-shot game are to conform to field conditions and to increase 
individual stakes. Experimental dollars were exchanged for real dollars one for one. The 
same six random induced values drawn for the small group experiments were used. The 
provision point was scaled up to $62.75 to maintain the same benefit-cost ratio (this change 
­
does not affect results since the PP is unknown to participants). 
Analysis ofthis experiment suggests that participants revealed their demand for the 
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public good in the aggregate. The second column ofTable 1 provides these striking results. 
The mean and median individual proportion of value contributed to the group fund were 
respectively 110% and 104%. The mean of 110% is statistically different, at the 1% confi­
dence level (t=3.788 > 2.685 = to.OOS.n=47 (<f l * <f2» from the mean of 64% found in the small 
group experiments. However, this test is biased by the fact that roughly a quarter of all 
individual contributions in the large group experiment appear to have been constrained by 
the initial endowment of $5. As such, the distribution ofcontributions is truncated, restrain­
ing both the mean and variance of the individual bid to value ratios. Yet, since the bias 
tends to lower the difference between the means, we are confident that the hypothesis of 
equality would still be rejected in the absence of the endowment constraint. Further, the 
median of l04% is a strong indicator of the central tendency of subjects to reveal demand 
and is unaffected by the truncation. 
Figure 2 illustrates the aggregate results. The ratio ofthe area under the revealed and 
induced demand curves is l07%. In marked contrast to undervaluation in small group PPM 
experiments, the group as a whole slightly over-revealed demand. This ratio is also affected 
by the capping ofcontributions at $5, but could only increase ifthe constraint was removed. 
In all, the results of this experiment are encouraging and suggest that it may be possible to 
construct a simulated market capable ofeliciting aggregate demand and simple enough for 
" field applications. 
Experiment 3: Large group of natural resources/non-economics students 
-

There is still an open debate over whether self-selection or training makes economics 
students more likely to act in self-interested ways (see Marwelland Ames; Isaac, McCue 
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and Plot; and Cadsby and Maynes). Because of the possible sensitivity of these experi­
ments to subject type, we set out to replicate the results of experiment 2 in a slightly differ­
ent environment. Subjects for the third experiment were a group of 45 students enrolled in 
an introductory natural resources course. Fewer than 5% of the students were currently 
taking or had previously taken an economics course. Also, in order to generate a better 
controlled and steeper demand function than previously, each subject was assigned to one 
of five induced values ranging from $1.50 to $4.50 (in real dollars), in increments of$0.75, 
for a mean benefit of$3 per person. The unannounced provision point was set at $45 for a 
benefit-cost ratio of 3. In an attempt to reduce the number of bids constrained by the en­
dowment, the initial balance was raised from $5 to $6. 
In aggregate, participants in this experiment revealed 95% of induced demand. 
Individually, the median bid to value ratio is 93%, and the mean of 103% is not significantly 
different from 100% (t=0.214). The mean raw bid of $2.86 is not statistically different from 
the mean induced value of $3.00 (t=0.49). The median bid made by subjects is exactly 
$3.00, equal to the mean and median individual induced benefit from the public good. 
Figure 3 illustrates, as noted for the previous experiment as well, that overbidding by some 
subjects approximately offsets the free-riding of others. Also, the revealed demand curve 
is steeper than the induced value function. Therefore, while all measures of central ten­
dency calculated from the revealed data are accurate, the slope of the revealed demand 
curve does not appear to be reliable and should only be used with extreme care in policy 
-

relevant work. 
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Summary and Implications 
Using large groups in an induced value experimental setting, this paper suggests that 
a proportional rebate, money back guarantee, provision point mechanism closely approxi­
mates demand revelation in the aggregate. This mechanism should be simple to implement 
and Wlderstand in field studies and is specifically designed for public goods with a predeter­
mined magnitude, much like the public goods that CV is frequently applied to. 
While the slopes ofthe resulting revealed demand curves are relatively poor approxi­
mations of the induced demand functions, the resulting measures of central tendency pro­
vided very strong predictors of the mean induced value. In the aggregate, free-riding is 
approximately compensated by the over-contributions of others -- a result that is in marked 
contrast to the 40 to 60 percent Wlderrevelation associated with the VCM. As such, we 
argue that the PP/MBG/PR mechanism represents a substantial improvement over VCM 
measures used as a reference criterion in recent CVIsimulated market validity tests. 
From the perspective of conducting field validity tests that accurately measure the 
hypothetical bias of the CV method, these result are encouraging. However, the extent to 
which such laboratory experiments reflect contribution situations in the real world remains 
to be determined. While our experimental environments resembled field conditions more 
closely than previous studies, the behavior of college students in laboratory settings cannot 
readily be taken to reflect that of ordinary citizen in every day life without additional re­
search, both in the lab and in the field. 
-
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Figure 1 
INDUCED AND REVEALED DEMAND CURVES 
Small Groups of Intro Economics Students 
500
 
400
 
.19 300 
c
 
~ 200
 
100 
o 
c=::J NOUCED DEtv'ANDro-. ro-. 
- RBlEALED DEtv'ANDf-
ro-. ~ 
"""-
~ 
'-
'""""" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 N 
"-------- ----~---- ---­
Figure 2 
I 
Induced and Revealed Demand 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
G) 
0200 
100 
o 
: 
i 
L
---­
-------­
Figure 3
--- .._-----­ - ----------­ -----~---------------
, 
Induced and Revealed Demand Curves 
Natural Resources 
i 
ITBnd I 1
-
\ Ic=::J nduced De 
-4 - Revealed De 
"\ 
400 
500 
.19 300 
c 
----------~-~---
600 
c::=:::J nduced DelTBnd 
500 1-Revealed DelTBnd 
400 " 
.19 
; 300 
o 
200
 
100
 
o 
11 
.......... 
q ""~ 
~ ~1' 
ItI- ~ r', I i "mm 1·11d ' ~ , II ~I 
G) 
N 
------------------~ - -----------------~---
-
13 
References 
Asch, P., G.A. Gigliotti and J.A. Polito. (1993). "Free Riding with Discrete and 
Continuous Public Goods: Some Experimental Evidence." Public Choice 77:293­
305. 
Bagnoli, M. and M. McKee. (1991). "Voluntary Contributions Games: Efficient Private 
Provision of Public Goods." Economic Inquiry 29:351-366. 
Bishop, R C., and T. A. Heberlein, 1979. "Measuring Values ofExtramarket Goods: Are 
Indirect Measures Biased?, American Journal ofAlUicultural Economics, 61:926­
30. 
Bishop, R C., T. A. Heberlein, and M.J. Kealy, 1983. "Contingent Valuation ofEnviron­
mental Assets: Comparisons with a Simulated Market, Natural Resources 
Journal,23:619-33. 
Bishop, R C., and T. A. Heberlein, 1990. "Chapter 6: The Contingent Valuation 
Method", in D. V. Johnson, ed. Economic Valuation ofNatural Resources: Issues. 
Theory. and $plications, 181-204. 
Bohm, P. (1972). "Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment." European 
Economic Review 3:111-130. 
Brookshire D.S., D.L. Coursey and W.D. Schulze. (1990). "Experiments in the 
Solicitation ofPrivate and Public Values: An Overview." in L. Green and J.H. 
Kagel eds. Advances in Behavioral Economics, Vol. n. Ablex Publishing 
Corporation. 
Cadsby, C.B., and E. Maynes. (1996). "Choosing Between a Cooperative and Non­
Cooperative Equilibrium: Nurses versus Economics and Business Students." 
UnpUblished Manuscript. 
Coursey D. and and V.L. Smith. (1984). "Experimental Tests of an Allocation 
Mechanism for Private, Public or Externality Goods." Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 86:468-484. 
Davis, D.D. and C.A. Holt. (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 572 pages. 
Dawes, R, J. Orbell, R Simmons and A. van de Kragt. (1986). "Organizing Groups for 
Collective Action." American Political Science Review 8:1171-85. 
Dickie, M., A. Fisher, and S. Gerking, 1987. Market Transactions and Hypothetical 
Demand Data: A Comparative Study, Journal of the American Statistical Society, 
82:69-75. 
Duffield, J. W. and D. A. Patterson, 1992. "Field Testing ofExistence Values: An 
Instream Flow Trust Fund for Montana Rivers", paper presented at the 
AERE/ASSA meetings, New Orleans. 
Groves, T. and J. Ledyard. (1977). "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to 
the 'Free Rider' Problem." Econometrica 45:783-809. -
Harstad, R. and M. Marrese. (1982). "Behavioral Explanations ofEfficient Public Good ,­
Allocations." Journal ofPublic Economics 19:367-383. 
14 
Isaac, RM., K. McCue and C. Plott. (1985). "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental 
Environment." Journal o/Public Economics 26:51-74. 
Isaac, RM., D. Schmidtz and J. Walker. (1989). "The Assurance Problem in Laboratory 
Markets." Public Choice 62:217-236. 
Isaac, RM., J. Walker and A. Williams. (1994). "Group Size and The Voluntary 
Provision ofPublic Goods: Experimental Evidence Using Very Large Groups." 
Journal o/Public Economics 54:1-36. 
Ledyard, J.O. (1995). "Public Goods: A Survey ofExperimental Research." in J.H. Kagel 
and A.E. Roth eds. Handbook ofExPerimental Economics. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. pp. 111-194. 
Marks, M.B. (1993). "The Effect ofAlternative Rebate Rules in the Provision Point 
Mechanism ofVoluntary Contributions: An Experimental Investigation." Unpub­
lished Manuscript. 
Marwell, G., and R Ames. (1981). "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experi­
ments on the Provision ofPublic Goods IV." Journal o/Public Economics 
15:295-310. 
Marwell G. and R Ames. (1979). "Experiments on the Provision ofPublic Goods I: 
Resources, Interest, Group Size and the Free Rider Problem." American Journal 
o/Sociology 84:926-937. 
Rapoport, A. and R. Suleiman. (1993). "Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public 
Goods Games with Asymmetric Players." Organizational Behavior and human 
Decision Processes 55:55:171-194. 
Rondeau, D., W.D. Schulze and G.L. Poe. (1996). "Demand Revelation in Single-Period 
Provision Point Mechanisms with Incomplete Information". Paper presented at 
the annual meetings of the Economic Science Association, Tucson, October, 20. 
Rose, S., J. Clark, G.L. Poe, D. Rondeau and W.D. Schulze. (1996). "Field and 
Laboratory Tests ofA Provision Point Mechanism." Paper presented at the annual 
meetings of the Economic Science Association. Tucson, October 19. 
Seip, K, and J. Strand, 1992. "Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods in Norway: 
A Contingent Valuation Study with Real Payment". Environemantl and Resource 
Economics, 2:91-106. 
Smith, V.L. (1980). "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Goods 
Decision." American Economic Review 70:584-599. 
Smith, V.L. (1979). "An Experimental Comparison ofThree Public Good Decision 
Mechanisms. Scandinavian Journal 0/Economics 81:198-215. 
Suleiman, R. and A. Rapoport. (1992). Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with 
Continuous Contribution." Journal o/Behavioral Decision Making 5:133-153. 
-

f 
No. 
No. 
No. 
96-07 
96-08 
96-09 
No. 96-10 
No. 96-11 
No. 96-12 
No. 96-13 
No. 96-14 
No. 96-15 
OTHER A.R.M.E. WORKING PAPERS
 
Commodity Futures Prices as 
Forecasts 
Old-Growth Forest and Jobs 
The Economic Threshold With a 
Stochastic Pest Population: An 
Application to the European Red 
Mite 
Competitive Electricity Markets in 
New York State: Empirical Impacts 
of Industry Restructuring 
Do Participants in Well Water 
Testing Programs Update Their 
Exposure and Health Risk 
Perceptions? 
A Hedonic Approach to Estimating 
Operation and Maintenance Costs for 
New York Municipal Water Systems 
The Productivity of Dairy Farms 
Measured by Non-Parametric 
Malmquist Indices 
A unique Measure of the Welfare 
Effects of Price Support Programs 
for Corn on Family-Farm Households 
by Size Distribution 
Economies of Size in Water 
Treatment vs. Diseconomies of 
Dispersion for Small Public Water 
Systems 
William G. Tomek 
Jon M. Conrad 
Jean-Daniel Saphores 
Jon M. Conrad 
Robert Ethier 
Timothy D. Mount 
Gregory Poe 
Harold van Es 
Maxine Duroe 
Christopher Crossman 
Timothy VandenBerg 
Richard Bishop 
Todd M. Schmit 
Richard N. Boisvert 
Loren W. Tauer 
Tebogo B. Seleka 
Harry de Gorter 
Richard N. Boisvert 
Todd M. Schmit 
• 
.' 
